Llywydd, I move amendment 1 in my name, which seeks to ensure that, in widening eligibility for medical membership of the Mental Health Review Tribunal for Wales to those without a licence to practise, we do not inadvertently widen it to those whose General Medical Council registration is subject to formal restrictions, suspension, interim suspension conditions or undertakings under the Medical Act 1983. Just in layman's terms, what does that mean? The GMC can restrict a doctor's registration where there are patient safety or professional conduct concerns. Sometimes, that means suspension, they can't practise at all, or interim suspension while matters are investigated, sometimes conditions—they can practise only within limits—and sometimes undertakings, binding commitments about what they will or won't do in practice. These are serious regulatory tools, and they exist to protect patients and maintain confidence in the profession.
The reason we bring this amendment, Llywydd, is that the appointment system already appears to be operating to this standard. The Judicial Appointments Commission's own documentation for medical member roles, including the first-tier mental health tribunal in England, states in terms that medical members must have unconditional registration with the General Medical Council, and recruitment material for the mental health tribunal for Wales has used exactly the same language,
'open to registered medical practitioners with unconditional registration with the GMC'.
Crucially, this is not just my interpretation of JAC paperwork; the Counsel General herself told the Senedd yesterday that medical members will have unconditional GMC registration alongside other requirements and training. Now, if that is the assurance the Government is relying upon, then placing the same safeguard on the face of the Bill should be consistent, in our view, with the Government's own position.
What is particularly striking is that, in at least one JAC selection report, they explicitly distinguish between the statutory eligibility test and the non-statutory appointments filter. The statutory test is fully registered, whether or not licensed—the very wording currently this Bill adopts—but the non-statutory eligibility criterion then adds the further safeguard that registration must be unconditional. In other words, the appointment system is already telling candidates and the public, 'Yes, the statute sets a floor, but we apply a higher standard in practice.'
So, the question today before us is simple: if that is the practical safeguard the system is already applying, why not reflect it on the face of this Act, where the definition we insert will sit on the statute book long after this immediate emergency has passed? There's also, I think, Llywydd, an operational and governance point. We've heard references to ongoing checks, and in other tribunal contexts it's been stated that GMC registration is checked at least annually through appraisal processes and that members are expected to notify the GMC of any change. If that is the intended approach here, it's all the more sensible to make the statutory eligibility test explicit so that those checks are anchored to a clear legal threshold and do not rely on administrative practice.
There is a wider public confidence point here. This is a tribunal making decisions that go directly to liberty. In that setting, the public are entitled to know that in removing a licence to practise requirement, we are not lowering standards. Indeed, we are giving greater regard to the absence of formal restrictions imposed by the regulator on a doctor's registration.
So, I ask the Counsel General—I'm grateful for the conversation we were able to have about an hour ago—is she willing to accept this amendment at this stage, which aligns the statute with what the JAC appears already to be saying in its documentation, unconditional registration in practice, while keeping the pool open to fully registered retired clinicians who do not hold a licence? And if she is not able to accept it at this stage, can she explain why the standard is set out in recruitment materials, but why it should remain non-statutory rather than placed in law when we are, in effect, rewriting the eligibility test in the statute today? In our view, if the Government's assurance is that medical members already meet that higher bar, then this amendment should make no practical difference to capacity, except to strengthen legal certainty and, crucially, public confidence.